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IrIFRI>:.TIONAL BAINK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPJENT
REPORT AND RECOi i.IENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED LOAN TO
THE KOREA DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION
WITH THE GUARANTEE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
loan in an amount in various currencies equivalent to $30 million to the
Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC), to be guaranteed by the
Republic of Korea.
PART I - HISTORICAL
2. The very high growth rate of the manufacturing sector, averaging
annually 22% during the last five years, has created a large demand for
long-term industrial financing. KDFC was established in April 1967 with
the assistance of the Bank Group to provide urgently needed indust.ial
financing on reasonable terms to the private sector. KDFC's initial cap-
italization, including equity investments by IFC, domestic and foreign
private investors and a long-term Government loan, was completed in
February 1968, when the Company received a 45 million loan from the Bank
and a $5 million loan from U.S. AID (later reduced to $3 million). A
second Bank loan of $20 million was approved in June 1969, and is likely
to be fully committed by June 1971, The proposed third loan of $30
million is expected to meet about three-quarters of KDFCt s requirements
for foreign exchange until the end of 1972.
3. Loan negotiations were held in Washington from March 22 to
March 26, 1971. The Borrower was represented by KDFCts President,
M'r. C.H. Kim. The Guarantor was represented by Mr. K.H. Kim from the
Economic Planning Board.
4. The proposed loan would be the fifth Bank loan to Korea, bringing
the total amount of Bank lending to $140 million. Korea has received six
IDA credits totalling $65.0 million. Before the end of this fiscal year,
I expect to submit a recommendation for a Bank loan of about $40 million
for a highway construction project. The first operation in the next
fiscal year will be an IDA credit for an agricultural credit project.
5. The following is a summary statement of Bank loans and IDA
credits as of March 31, 1971:
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Loan or Amount (U.S. $ million)
Credit No. Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisburc<.1
25 1962 Republic of Korea Railway 14.0 -
110 1967 Republic of Korea Railway 10.7 -
529 1968 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 5.0 0.2
S-4 1968 Republic of Korea Highway Studies 3.5 1.0
600 1969 ADC Irrigation 45.0 43.9
151 1969 Republic of Korea Education 14.8 14.7
622 1969 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 20.0 13.4
669 1970 Republic of Korea Railway 4o.0 39.7
183 1970 Republic of Korea Railway 15.0 14.9
234-' 1971 Republic of Korea Livestock 7.0 7.0
Total (less cancellations) 110.0 65.o 134.8
of which has been repaid
to the Bank and others 0.1
Total now outstanding 109.9
Amount sold 0.8
of which has been repaid _ 0.8
Total now held by Bank and IDA 109.1 65.o
Total undisbursed 97.2 37.6 134.8
1/ Not yet effective
6. Disbursements of the irrigation loan are behind schedule because
it took longer than expected for the borrower to employ consultants, and
because the original borrower was succeeded by a new organization about
vwhose competence the Bank had to satisfy itself. Three major contracts
have now been awarded and disbursements to cover civil works and equipment
expenditures can be expected to pick up within the next few months.
Additional major civil works contracts are expected to be awarded in the
second half of 1971. The appointment of consultants under the education
credit was also delayed and this held u.p design work. However, work is
now well under way and disbursements for construction and equipment should
start in the near future. Disbursemnents under the credit for highway
studies and the railway loan and credit are progressing satisfactorily.
7. IFC has made the following investments:
U.S. $ million
Loans Shares
1968 KDFC 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Co. 1.4 0.3
1970 Atlas Paper Co. 4.5 0.5
Present holdings amount to $7.4 million in loans and shares. Further
possibilities are being investigated.
PART II - DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED LOAN
8. Borrower: Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC)
Guarantor: Republic of Korea
Amount: Variou.s currencies equivalent to
$30 million
Purpose: To enable KDFC to finance the foreign
exchange costs of specific projects
undertaken by private industrial enter-
prises in Korea
Amortization: In 14 years including a 21 year period
of grace, through semi-annual install-
ments beginning Miarch 15, 1974 and
ending March 15, 1985. The Bank and
KDFC will from time to time change the
amortization schedule to conform sub-
stantially to the aggregate of amortiza-
tion schedules for sub-loans and invest-
ments for which withdrawals from the
Loan Account have been approved.
Interest Rate: 7;4/ per annum
Commitment Charge: 3/4 of 1% per annum
PART III - THE PROJECT
9. A report entitled "Appraisal of Korea Development Finance
Corporation" (DB-76a) dated April 12, 1971 is attached.
10. Manufacturing has been the fastest growing sector of the
Korean economy, increasing its share in the GNP during the past ten
years from 14% to 26%. Exports have been increasing at an annual
average rate of about 40% during the past few years, with exports of
manufactured goods growing at nearly 50% a year. The share of manu-
factured goods in total exports is about 80%, with textiles, machinery
and plywood leading the way.
11. Industry in Korea is predominantly privately-owned, with the
Government owning only about 5% of the total capital invested in manu-
facturing. Commercial and development banks from which businessmen can
borrow funds are limited in number and resources, causing many enter-
prises to turn to the expensive curb market for short-term local funds,
and to suppliers' credits and short-term foreign comrnercial bank loans
for foreign exchange. The commercial banks, predominantly Government-
controlled, rarely lend on terms exceeding one year. In addition to
KDFC, only the Korea Development Bank (KDB) and the Medium Industry
Bank (MIB) provide medium and long-term financing for industrial ventur-es.
The KDB and the MIB are both Government-controlled, and finance projects
in both the private and public sectors, usually to further specific
Government programs and policies.
12. As of December 31, 1970 KDFC?s total resources amounted to
$43.1 million, consisting of share capital and retained earnings, the
Government subordinated loan, an AID loan and twzo Bank loans. Total
commitments for loans and equity investments, as of the end of last year,
were the equivalent of about $32 million, of which foreign exchange
commitments amounted to $24 million. Total disbursements by KDFC of
about $10 million equivalent in 1970 represented 2.7% of the estimated
gross domestic fixed capital investment in manufacturing, and its out-
standing portfolio at year end equalled about 10% of the estimated total
amount of outstanding loans for industrial capital goods in Korea. While
KDFC's quantitative contribution to industrial financing is relatively
small, the company has made a significant qualitative contribution to
economic development in Korea by introducing a modern outlook in
industrial investment and by the educational impact of its project
appraisals.
13. KDFC's portfolio is well diversified among textiles, paper
products, rubber tires and other mainly export-oriented enterprises.
As KDFC does not lend for working capital, and requires its clients to
put up at least one-third of total project costs, the greater part of
its financing has been for foreign exchange expenditures. In 1970,
foreign currency financing represented slightly more than 70% of its
total loans and investments.
1. KDFC's total foreign exchange resources, amounting to $28
million as of the end of last year, are expected to be fully comnLitted
soon. Commitments of foreign exchange for 1971 and 1972 are projected
at slightly over $40 million, Apart from the proposed $30 million Bank
loan, KDFC has obtained a $5 million loan from Caterpillar Far East Ltd.
tied to purchases of Caterpillar equipment, and is trying to obtain
additional funds from sources in Europe and Japan.
15. Uncommitted local currency resources, presently about W1.9
billion ($6 million equivalent), together with repayments and retained
earnings, should be sufficient to meet the demand on KDFC for local cost
financing up to the end of 1972. However, KDFC plans share capital
increases for the first half of 1972 and 1973. The first issue, to-
gether with stock issues in February 1971 and 1972, will increase KDFC's
present paid-in capital of W1.64 billion ($5.2 million equivalent) to
the full amount of its authorized capital, W2.7 billion or $8.5 million
equivalent. Thereafter KDFC plans to increase the authorized capital
to about W5 billion and to make a further share issue of about W675
million ($2.1 million equivalent) in 1973.
16. Because of the undeveloped state of the capital and money
markets in Korea, KDFC, with the support of the Government, is taking
the lead in establishing a new financial institution. Such an insti-
tution could make a very useful contribution by developing a market
for short-term commercial paper; it could help private enterprises
raise equity funds through underwriting arrangements, and could create
a secondary market for the securities which it underwrote. KDFC plans
to subscribe 25% of the equity of the new institution, to be called the
Korea Investment Corporation (KIC), and the Goverment has requested an
IFC participation. IFC is working on this proposal with KDFC and the
Government.
17. KDFC's financial position is sound. Reserves and retained
earnings increased from 40% of share capital in 1968 to 85% as of the
end of 1970. Net profits for 1970 were W604 million ($1.9 million
equivalent), an increase of 16% over the previous year. In 1969 and
1970 KDFC declared a 20% dividend (10% in cash, 10% in shares) and
plans to do the same for the next few years.
18. KDFC's management is strong and its staff competent. The
Bank's experience with KDFC has been satisfactory and it is recommended
that, under the proposed loan, KDFC be authorized to approve individual
subloans up to $500,000 without the prior approval of the Bank, subject
to an aggregate limit of $7.5 million.
PART IV - LEGAL INSTRUITENTS AND AUTHORITY
19. The draft Loan Agreement between the Bank and the Korea Develop-
ment Finance Corporation, the draft Guarantee Agreement between the
Republic of Korea and the Bank, the Report of the Committee provided for
in Article III, Section 4(iii) of the Articles of Agreement and the text
of a draft Resolution approving the proposed Loan are being distributed
to the Executive Directors separately.
20. The draft Loan and Guarantee Agreements conform substantially
to the pattern of agreements for loans to development finance companies.
PART V - THE ECONOIMY
21. A report entitled 'Economic Position and Prospects of the
Republic of Korea" (EAP-12a, dated March 16, 1970) was circulated to the
Executive Directors on March 27, 1970. An updated economic memorandum
and a basic data sheet are attached; they are based on information
collected by an economic mission which visited Korea last September/
October. In the light of this information and a review of the forth-
comina Third Five-Year Plan scheduled by the Bank for next June, a new
economic report is to be prepared in time for the next meeting of the
Consultative Group in October 1971.
- 6 -
PART VI - COMPLIANCE WqITH ARTICLES OF AIREEIMIT
22. I am satisfied that the proposed Loan would comply with the
Articles of Agreement of the Bank.
PART VII - RECOMMlvENDATION
23. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
Loan.
Attachments Robert S. McNamara
President
April 13, 1971
ANNEX
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BASIC DATA - REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Area 98,438 sq. km.
Population (mid year 1970) 31.79 million
Growth Rate (1970) 2.2% a/
Density (per sq. km.) 323
Gross National Product
Total (1970 at current prices) 2,562 billion won
Annual average real rate of growth (1965-70) 11.3%
Per Capita GNP (1970) $223 equivalent
Industrial Origin of Real GNP (1970) 100%
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 26%
Ilining and PManufacturing 28p
Economic Overhead and Construction 13%o
Other Services 33%
(Wholesale and Retail Trade) (17%)
Gross Domestic Expenditure 1965 1969 1970
current prices: as percentage of GDP)
Consumption 94 84 84
Private 73 73
Public 10 11 11
Gross CaDital Formation 14.8 30.4 26.2
Gross Domestic Saving 8.2 19.1 16.3
Private (6.4) (12.7) n.a.
Public (1.8) ( 6.4) n.a.
Resource Gan 6.6 11.3 9.9
Public Finance
(current prices, in billion won)
Current Revenue 91 370 n.a.
Current Expenditure 81 248 n.a.
Surplus 10 122 n.a.
Capital Expenditure 41 231 n.a.
Receipts from Counterpart Funds 33 17 n.a.
a/ This figure has not been adjusted by the result of the 1970 census,
which shows an average annual growth rate of 1.9% between 1966 and
1970.
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1965 1969 1970
Money and Credit
(annual rate of change in percent)
Mioney Supply 33 46 41
Time and Saving Deposits 112 77 27
Total Bank Credit Outstanding L2 60 32
Price Indices (percent increase)
Consumer Prices (Seoul) 13.6 10.1 12.7
Wholesale Prices 10.0 6.8 9.1
Balance of Payments (in million US$)
Mercinandise Exports (f.o.b.) 175 658 882
Merchandise Imports (f.o.b.) -416 -1,650 -1,761
Deficit -241 -992 -879
Receipts from Military Expenditures 74 249 232
Other Services, net -27 - 51 -132
Balance on Goods & Service Account -194 -794 -779
International Liquidity (in million Us$)
Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves 146 550 606
Month's Imports of Goods & Services 4 3 3
Ii%F Quota 18.8 50 50
IMIF Drawings (outstanding) - 12.5 12.5
Net Inflow of Foreign Capital (in million US$)
Grants 203 244 178
Loans -3 634 493
Direct Investment _ 16 65
Total 200 894 741
External Debt
Total outstanding external debt (disbursed) with maturity of over one
year at the end of 1970: $1,982 million
Amortization and interest payments on these debts during 1970 were
estimated at $321 million, or 23.4% of export earnings.
Exchange Rate (end December 1970). Banks' selling rate: 317 won to
the dollar
April 13, 1971
UPDATING MEIORANDUM ON THE KOREAN ECONOMY
Economic Achievement
1. Rapid economic growth with strong emphasis on exports has
been a basic objective of the Government's policy. W4ith no scarcity of
entrepreneurial talent and a well-educated and disciplined labor force,
the private sector responded quickly to the opportunities afforded by
the policy changes of 1964 that included major interest and exchange
rate reforms and the subsequent Government emphasis on rapid industrial-
ization. An aggressive export drive and a high rate of investment
helped to transform the Korean economy. GNP increased in real terms by
11% a year during 1965-70, while GNP per capita rose by almost 9% a
year to reach US$223 in 1970. Exports rose from a low base at an annual
rate of 0/o.
2. The rapid growth has been concentrated in industry and infra-
structure, which provided almost 60% of the increase in GNP since 1965.
Industrial growth has been mainly in the major export industries such
as textiles, plywood and more recently, wigs, the investment goods
industries and such intermediate industries as chemicals, and petroleum
and coal products. In addition to the stimulus of investment and
export demand on industrial growth, there have been heavy public ex-
penditures in infrastru.cture development, particularly ports, express-
ways and industrial complexes. The performance of agriculture, on the
other hand, has been disappointing, with an average growth rate of 3-h%
a year in 1965-69. As a result, Korea has had to rely heavily on
imports of grains during this period to meet her food needs.
3. The population of Korea is about 32 million, of which some 37%
are in urban centers. The population growth rate, restrained by an
active official family planning program, declined frcm an average 2.8% a
year in the first half of the decade to 2.2% in 1970. The economically
active population increased at 2% a year during 1965-69 while employment
increased at 2.6% a year. Thus, Korea has been able to expand its
employment opportunities sufficiently to absorb the increase in the
labor force and at the same time, reduce the level of unemployment from
abou.t 7.4% in 1965 to 4.8% in 1969.
Some Strains of Rapid Growth
4. While this unprecedented expansion in all phases of economic
activity has led to greater prosperity, the benefits have been unevenly
shared and the rapid industrialization inevitably has created consider-
able strains in the economy. The slow growth and adverse terms of trade
in agriculture have meant a virtual stagnation of farm income since 1963.
The average income of urban workers, on the other hand, increased by
about 60% in the same period. Along with these income disparities, the
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concentration of industrial development in urban areas and rapid growth
of the urban population has led to traffic congestion, shortages of
social services and housing and increased levels of pollution in major
urban centers, particularly in Seoul.
5. W4hile exports have been rising rapidly, both the expansion of
investment demand at a rate greatly in excess of the rate of increase
in domestic savings and the low domestic content of industrial produc-
tion have caused an equally rapid increase in imports. Consequently,
the foreign deficit increased steadifly from $194 million in 1965 to
$794 million in 1969. The external gap has been filled by an inflowq of
foreign capital. However, because of the decline in foreign official
grants and loans, Korea has relied increasingly on commercial loans
since 1967, which have led to a rapid increase in her debt servicing
obligations.
6. Rapid income growth has also been accompanied by chronic excess
demand which, in turn, has led to rising price and wage levels. During
1965-69 the Seoul consumer price index rose by 11.5% a year while the
money wage of workers in the manufacturing sector increased by 24% a year.
Wholesale prices in this period increased by about 23% in relation to
external prices, whereas the exchange rate depreciated by only 10%. In
these circumstances, export growth has relied increasingly on various
incentives provided by the Government such as tax privileges, conces-
sional interest rates, tariff exemptions on imported inputs, and the
privilege of importing controlled items.
Efforts to Stabilize the Economy
7. Thus, Korea's outstanding economic performance has been
achieved at the cost of moderate, but continuous inflation, a persistent
balance of payments deficit and heavy external debt. Realizing the
importance of keeping the external debt burden within manageable limits
and of containing inflation, the Government in late 1969 adopted a set
of monetary and fiscal stabilization measures that were designed to limit
the growth of private consumption, curb credit expansion and to cut dowm
the growth of imports and foreign borrowing. These policies were under-
taken by the Government in agreement with the Fund and were specified in
a Standby Agreement which contained annual ceilings on additional medium
and long-term foreign borrowing and on domestic credit expansion.
8. The stabilization program hlas had significant effects on the
economy in 1970, the most important being the fall in investment and
foreign borrowing and the slow down in import growth. Fixed capital
formation at constant prices fell by almost 2% and GNP at constant
prices rose by 9.7%, as compared to 15.9% in 1969. The slower rise in
GNP was partly due to stabilization efforts but was also partly because
of the small increase in agricultural output from the large base of the
1969 bumper crop year. Imports of goods and services increased by only
10% in 1970, as compared with 25% in 1969. Exports jumped by 34%0, al-
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though part of this was offset by lower service receipts, so that the
increase in the goods and services account was 19% in 1970. As a resullt,
the deficit on the goods and services account was reduced slightly from
$794 million in 1969 to $779 million in 1970. This was the first time
since 1965 that there was not a sharp increase in the deficit. Foreign
loans of more than one year maturity committed in 1970 amounted to
$544 million, which was considerably less than the $916 million in 1969.
At the end of 1970, Korea's total external debt amounted to abou.t $2
bi].lion and the debt service ratio exceeded 20% (11% in 1969).
9. Despite the considerable efforts by the Government, however,
the stabilization policies, while improving the situation, have not
been sufficient to restore internal financial stability nor to ensure
a more than temporary respite from the mounting requirements of external
finance. Private consumption still rose by 11% in 1970, over 10% faster
than GNP, and the price level went up by more than in 1969. The
stabilization program has only temporarily eased the pressures on the
country's external position. The pressures are likely to persist, for
Korea's economy has becorme geared to a high rate of growth which cannot
be slowed down abruptly without export and employment difficulties and
other severe dislocation.
10. During 1971, the Government plans to continue its emphasis on
export expansion while avoiding excessive increases in the external debt
burden. The Government has set target increases of 10% for real GI\ and
less than 3%O for gross investrmient. The Central Government's expenditure
for 1971 is budgeted to increase by about 18%, with some of the increase
allocated to defense in view of the partial reduction of U.S. forces.
Because of the uncertainties in the world market and developments in
Vietnam, the rate of increase in exports of goods and services is
expected to slow down. The Government has recently agreed to limitations
on new external debt and domestic credit expansion in the IId' Standby
Agreement for 1971.
Longer Ru.n Prospects
11. The Korean planning authorities' growth objective for the
Third Five-Year Plan (1972-76) is 8.6% a year, a reduction from the 11%
achieved in 1965-70. During the Plan period, particular attention will
be given to the development of agriculture and the capital goods
industry. The Government's objectives for agricultural development are
to achieve foodgrain self-sufficiency and to raise farm incomes in the
hope of reducing the present rural-urban income gap. By expediting the
development of the capital goods industry, the Government hopes both to
spur industrial growth and reduce Korea's present heavy dependence on
imported capital goods. The Governraent will continue to give high
priority to the rapid expansion of merchandise exports, having set the
1976 target at $3.5 billion, which, together with a sharp reduction in
the growth of imports,:is expected to contribute to a substantial improve-
nent in Korea's balance of payments position without leading to an
increase in unemployment.
12. The projected growth rate seems likely to require a larger
investment outlay than allowed for in Korean plans, and the Korean
export goal may be too much to expect by 1976. On the other hand,
Korean capabilities for economic growrth generally, and for export
expansion in particular, should not be under-rated, considering the
record of rapid development and effective econo.mic management in
recent years. Nevertheless, formidable problems will have to be dealt
with, especially in the promotion of exports and in the management of
external debt.
13. Industrial products are expected to be the mainstay of further
export expansion, and this raises the question of competitiveness of
Korean manufactures. Substantial export subsidies are already required
and industrial exports in the future will probably have to include
heavier and more complex products for which Korean costs, relative to
international costs, are likely to be higher, for a time anyway, than
for the present pattern of manufactured exports. Thus, achievement of
the export target will require additional measures of export encourage-
ment.
1k. Korea's requirements for external capital will continue to be
high if rapid development is to be sustained, even if policies of
restraint are pursued. The reasons for this are the high level of debt
service that has already been reached, the wide gap that remains between
savings and investment even after the impressive gains in savings to a
level of 16% of GOiP in 1970 (and the plan target of 21% by 1976), and
the expected deterioration in the service account of Korea's balance of
payments due to withdrawals of U.S. forces from Korea and Korean forces
from Vietnam. A substantial reduction in the requirements for foreign
resources cannot be achieved quickly without a sharp deceleration in
the rate of investment, which, in turn, would have unacceptable conse-
quences for employment, income and exports. Nevertheless, considering
the past dynamic performance of the economy, the determination of Korea
to pursue rapid development withnout excessive instability, and the
capability and resourcefulness of both the public and private sectors,
it seems reasonable to expect Korea to continue on its course of rapid
economic development and it can be considered creditworthy for further
Bank loans. Considering Korea's low level of per capita income and
heavy dependence on foreign capital, some of the assistance from the
Bank Group should continue to be on IDA terms.
April 13, 1971
